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THE DEATH OF AN AUTHOR, BY HIMSELF
MARK TUSHNET*
Legal scholars have heard literary critics proclaim the death of
the author. Yet, as this Symposium shows, it is one thing to hear the
death of some generalized author announced, quite another to be an
author reading his or her own obituary. Authors seem inevitably
drawn to the Romantic vision of their task, in which the product of
their pens is somehow an expression of their very own individuality.
To be told that texts "are"-or at the very least will become-what
readers make of them is to deprive Romantic authors of something
they believe to be at the core of their activity.
When we think of ourselves as commentators on the legal work
of others,' we are not troubled in asserting that what an opinion
means, for example, is what it is taken to mean by its readers. 2 One
line of inquiry developing from this assertion would explore the ways
in which particular phrasings affect the meanings readers give an opin-
ion. Obviously, readers who see the words, "Affirmative action pro-
grams are subject to strict scrutiny and are permissible only under the
most compelling circumstances," are likely to take the words to mean
something different from, "Affirmative action programs are permissi-
ble when they are reasonable means suitably adapted to rectifying a
legacy of discrimination."'3 At the least, readers are likely to think it
more difficult to justify affirmative action programs after reading the
first phrase than they would after reading the second.
This suggests that the editorial process, in which an author's
words are subjected to revision by a first set of readers, may affect
what the words that are ultimately published mean. I want to suggest,
however, that the effects of this first transformation are likely to be
significantly smaller than the already-in-place routines that the larger
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am aware of the two most
obvious senses in which the title of this comment can be taken.
1. I acknowledge immediately the problem in this statement, which implicitly purports to
distinguish between our "conimentary"-taken to be something that exists outside the critical
enterprise described by the phrase, "the death of the author"-and that which we comment on,
which is the object of-and therefore in some sense subordinate to-our commentary.
2. And not, in particular, what the opinion's author "meant" it to mean.
3. Or maybe not so obviously. On one (controversial) interpretation of the "death of the
author" theory, the proposition is obvious only because readers are already socialized into an
understanding of the distinction between "strict scrutiny" and "reasonableness."
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audience of readers uses in reading the ultimate product.4 The mean-
ing of a sentence in the passive voice, to use the conventional exam-
ple, is indeed different from the meaning of a sentence in the active
voice, but the margin is, I believe, quite small compared to the differ-
ences in meanings that arise from discrepancies between an author's
routine and those deployed by readers.
My observations here result from my reflections on recent exper-
iences with an article I wrote. The experience can be summarized in
this way: The article I thought I wrote is not the one readers appear
to have read, although the words in the article I thought I wrote are
the words in the article readers read.
For the past few years I have been playing around with the idea
that literary style has something to do with the ability of judicial opin-
ions to become authoritative. 5 Roughly put, the idea is that the "bet-
ter written" an opinion is, the more likely it is to become an
authoritative precedent. In pursuing that idea, I have tried to explore
two lines of inquiry that I suspect are linked.
First, and obviously connected to the theme of this comment, lit-
erary style is a social construction. So, for example, I have tried to
think through propositions like, "Justice Robert Jackson's reputation
as a literary stylist is founded primarily on his ability to get off quota-
ble lines rather than his ability to develop a sustained argument, and
the ability to get off quotable lines is given a positive value in a setting
in which the principal means of communication about law is the short
newspaper story."
Second, and more problematic, I have been intrigued by the
thought that there may be some connection between the judicial vir-
tue of integrity and literary style. Here I have worried that I may be
misled by the fact that we can use the word integrity to refer both to
the artistic integrity of a literary production, which is itself a virtue in
that context, and to a personal characteristic.
One article in the group I have written examined three topics:
the literary style of some Supreme Court opinions, the personal char-
acteristics revealed in a hearing on the confirmation of a Supreme
4. Such as it is for law review articles.
5. Mark lbshnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992)
[hereinafter Tlshnet, Degradation]; Mark Tushnet, Style and The Supreme Court's Educational
Role in Government, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 215 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Character and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Character as
Argument, 14 LAW & Soc. INOUtRY 539 (1989) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRAnmoN: FREEDOM OF SPEECH iN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988)).
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Court nominee, and the literary style of important recent work in the
field of jurisprudence. 6 The principal opinion I discussed was Justice
Blackmun's separate opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services.7 His opinion contains the widely noted
phrase, "Poor Joshua." 8 Although many commentators take the opin-
ion, and the phrase, to show how a judge's empathy can be expressed
in his opinions,9 I found it to be bathetic instead. I contrasted Justice
Blackmun's personalization in his DeShaney opinion with what I be-
lieved to be the more effective personalization in Justice Brennan's
dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp,10 and I tried to explain why I believed
Justice Brennan's rhetoric was more effective than Justice Black-
mun's. This discussion of the opinions' literary integrity was coupled
with a discussion of some problems I encountered in reading some
passages in several prominent works of narrative jurisprudence. I ar-
gued that those passages displayed problems of literary integrity
paralleling those in Justice Blackmun's opinion. These discussions of
literary integrity bracketed a discussion devoted to establishing as
carefully as I could that Clarence Thomas had lied before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which raised the question of judicial integrity.
I think it fair to say that essentially no one saw the article as I did.
It has generally been taken as a vicious attack on narrative jurispru-
dence, and on the work of Patricia Williams in particular; the rest of
the article has been ignored."' Some of the criticisms articulate inter-
6. Tushnet, Degradation, supra note 5.
7. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8. Id. at 213.
9. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAD. L. REV. 1665, 1675 (1990).
10. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
11. The term vicious has been used in conversations. I have collected citations to the arti-
cle, and quote parenthetically the descriptions to which the citations are attached: Jane B.
Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL L. REV. 255, 255 (1994) ("at pains to point up the limita-
tions of the storytelling genre"); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence,
34 WM. & MARY L REV. 741, 752 n.90 (1993) ("discussing stylistic flaws in certain influential
narratives which undermine the format's effectiveness as legal scholarship"); Robert E. Scott,
Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 345-46 n.85 (1993) ("Mark
Tushnet has suggested analogous views" to those expressed in articles constituting a "counter-
reaction which questioned the uniqueness of a black voice, and asked if minorities promoted
their best interests by demanding to be judged by a standard different from the meritocratic
norm purportedly used by white America"); David A. Skeel, Jr., Practicing Poetry, Teaching
Law, 92 MicH. L. REV. 1754, 1769 n.55 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE JOSEPH, BEFORE OUR
EYES (1993)) ("Legal storytellers have recently come under attack by commentators questioning
the accuracy of the storytellers' 'real-life' accounts"). For the record, my view is that Delgado's
characterization is the most accurate among those critical of the article, and that other even
more qualified characterizations are even more accurate. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What We
Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1896 n.43 (1993) ("criticizing certain feminist and
critical race narratives") (emphasis added); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
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esting analyses, actually congruent with my interest in the social con-
struction of standards of style.12 As an author, my reaction to these
comments has ranged from a bemused, "Some of these things are in-
teresting comments on a certain view of narrative jurisprudence in
general, but they have little to do with what I wrote," to a sterner
annoyance at the "mis"-characterization of my views. 13
On reflection, however, both reactions reflect the Romantic view
of authorship that, in my critical writings, I reject. For, in any relevant
sense, the article now "is"-and therefore is (without scare quotes)-
an attack on narrative jurisprudence, because that is how it has been
read by the relevant community of readers.
Some comments on this "transformation" seem worth making. 14
First, we might think that there were some limits to the process. Per-
haps it is not worth worrying too much about whether law review edi-
tors insert too many passive voice constructions into an otherwise
elegantly written article, although I will comment on that issue in a
moment. We might think, though, that certainly an article cannot
come to mean the opposite of what it "says." That, we might think,
would be as if the community of readers inserted the word not in a
sentence like, "Justice Marshall has argued that the death penalty was
unconstitutional under all circumstances," to make it either, "Justice
Marshall has not argued .. .," or "Justice Marshall has argued that the
death penalty was not unconstitutional under all circumstances." My
experience suggests that the limits are rather broad. My article said
the following: "I find it largely uninteresting to ask whether the
Benetton or Au Coton stories 'actually happened,' because events like
those certainly have happened."'1 5 The critics of my article regularly
assert that I do not believe Williams's account of the events. 16
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 807 n.3 (1993) ("Mark
Tbshnet critiques some aspects of legal storytelling") (emphasis added).
12. Especially the first and most detailed, Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Deg-
radation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992).
13. In particular, at the transformation of a critique of selected passages into a criticism of
narrative jurisprudence in general.
14. Again, the scare quotes are necessary.
15. Tushnet, Degradation, supra note 5, at 273 n.101.
16. The incompleteness of my statement was justified by the issue I was discussing. A more
complete statement would have been that it was both uninteresting and irrelevant to ask
whether the events had actually happened, because Williams's work presents itself as on the
contested border between imaginative literature and historical reconstruction (and is designed in
part to raise questions about that distinction itself). In one sense, then, the events could not
have happened (did Hamlet "actually" kill Polonius?), and in another sense they must have (of
course Hamlet "actually" killed Polonius). The events Williams describes exist-for her read-
ers-only within the text itself.
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Second, we might explore how the transformation came about.
Again, this would commit us to a controversial view of how meaning is
constructed. One reason the transformation occurred, I believe, is
that it was published along with a severely critical response. What
happened was the not uncommon phenomenon of the dissenting opin-
ion defining the scope of the majority opinion.17 I certainly have occa-
sionally read the response to an article to find a summary of the
original's argument, only then turning to the "original," but of course
with my view of the article already affected by the response I have
read.
Here I invoke what I am inclined to call a socio-political analysis
of how readers read. So, for example, I would ask, "What is it about
the sociology and politics of the contemporary legal academy that led
a community of readers to take my article as it did?" 18 This suggests,
however, that authors might properly be concerned about the inser-
tion of too many passive voice constructions, if they are concerned
about their works' reception. For, it could be-although we would
actually need to do some socio-political analysis to be sure-that read-
ers systematically attach less value to articles with many passive voice
constructions than they do to articles with few such constructions.
They might do so, for example, if they were regularly told that articles
with many passive voice constructions were, for that reason alone,
worse than other articles.
Authors, then, might not be completely moribund. They might
retain some control over what their works mean, if they understand
the sociology and politics of the community of readers.19 This is not
the full-blown Romantic account of authorship, but it may be all that
we have.
And yet, at the end of the day, sometimes I certainly want to say,
"But that's not what my article says, and it's not what I meant."
17. I owe this observation to my colleague Daniel Ernst.
18. I developed that analysis in my reply to Peller, and need not elaborate it here. Mark
Thshnet, Reply to Peller, 81 Gao. L.J. 343 (1992).
19. I should note one difficulty that I have elided to this point Authors confront not a
single community of readers, but multiple communities, each with its own socio-politics. An
author might therefore be able to exert some control over a work's meaning within one commu-
nity of readers and simultaneously, because of the very strategies used to exert that control there,
lose control completely within another community.
1994]

